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Article
When Patients Say No (To Save Money): An Essay on
the Tectonics of Health Law
MARK A. HALL & CARL E. SCHNEIDER
The ultimate aim of health care public policy is good care at good prices. Managed
care stalled at achieving this goal by trying to influence providers, so health policy has
turned to the only market-based option left: treating patients like consumers. Health
insurance and tax policy are now pressuring patients to spend their own money when they
select health plans, providers, and treatments. Expecting patients to choose what they need
at the price they want, consumerists believe that market competition will constrain costs
while optimizing quality. This classic form of consumerism is today's watchword.
This Article evaluates this ideal type of consumerism and the regulatory mechanism of
which it is essentially an example-legally mandated disclosure of information. We do so
by assessing the crucial assumptions about human nature on which consumerism and
mandated disclosure depend Consumerism operates in a variety of contexts in a variety of
ways with a variety of aims. To assess so protean a thing, we ask what a patient's life
would really be like in a consumerist world. The literature abounds in suppositions about
how medical consumers should behave. We look for empirical evidence about how real
people actually buy health plans, choose providers, and select treatments.
We conclude that consumerism, and thus mandated disclosure generally, are unlikely
to accomplish the goals imagined for them. Consumerism 's prerequisites are too many and
too demanding. First, consumers must have choices that include the coverage, care-takers,
and care they want. Second, reliable information about those choices must be available.
Third, information must be put before consumers, especially by doctors. Fourth, consumers
must receive the information. Fifth, the information must be complete and comprehensible
enough for consumers to use it. Sixth, consumers must understand what they are told.
Seventh, consumers must be willing to analyze the information. Eighth, consumers must
actually analyze the information and do so well enough to make good choices.
Our review of the empirical evidence concludes that these prerequisites cannot be met
reliably most of the time. At every stage people encounter daunting hurdles. Like so many
other dreams of controlling costs and giving patients control, consumerism is doomed to
disappoint. This does not mean that consumerist tools should never be used It means they
should not be used unadvisedly or lightly, but discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear
of error.
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When Patients Say No (To Save Money): An Essay on
the Tectonics of Health Law
MARK A. HALL** & CARL E. SCHNEIDER***
I. INTRODUCTION
The parts of health law, one might say, rest on neighboring tectonic
plates. On one plate is the law of malpractice. On an adjoining plate is the
law of bioethics-the law that regulates the ethical affairs of patients,
including their relationships with doctors and the way their medical
decisions are made. On still another contiguous plate is the law of health
economics, which has been concerned in recent decades with controlling
costs.
Each part of health law has not just its own central purposes but also
its own basic assumptions.1  For years each part developed quite
independently, so that one area impinged little on the others. Recently,
however, the development of the law has increasingly brought the plates
together. This has produced tremors, but the seismic potential of these
encounters has gone unnoticed. We write to draw attention to this
potential, to ways it is changing health law, and to questions it increasingly
presents. We do so through a case study of one tectonic encounter-a
patient who says no to standard-of-care treatment because of its cost and
then sues in malpractice when harm results. This conflict springs directly
out of health policy's new mantra, "consumer-directed health care," but
before we tell that story, we first sketch each health care field and how it
grew.
The law of malpractice developed when the doctor was the director of
the patient's care.2 Paternalism was the norm; doctors were the experts.
Medicine, like all professions, governed itself and set its own standards;
doctors, like all professionals, decided how to do their work. The doctor's
* We are grateful for the support of a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Investigator Award in
Health Policy Research. We thank Michael Green for helpful comments. For the reasons described in
Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L Rev 1343 (1986), we follow the
University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, as updated by The University of Chicago Law Review
Style Sheet for Volume 76, online at http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/resources/style sheet.html.
Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law & Public Health, Wake Forest University.
Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law & Professor of Internal Medicine, University of
Michigan.
1 See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 Cal L Rev 1449,1452 (1994).
2 See generally Nancy M.P. King, Larry R. Churchill, and Alan W. Cross, eds, The Physician as
Captain of the Ship: A Critical Reappraisal (D. Reidel 1988).
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role as director of care was sustained by the culture of medicine. It set
standards of craft skill. It taught craft pride. It committed doctors to a
fiduciary obligation to make the patients' welfare their lodestar. Patients
were supposed to recognize this and respond by following doctors' orders.
When patients sued for malpractice, the standard of performance was (and
is) set by the minima the profession established, and those standards were
(and are) identified by the expert testimony of a member of the profession.
Today, however, the patient is-at least in principle-the director of
care. This is the essence of the law of bioethics, whose soul is the
principle of autonomy-the principle that patients have the right to make
decisions about their treatment.3 Doctrinally, this principle is embodied in
the law of informed consent, which requires the patient's approval of any
treatment and hence permits the patient to refuse any treatment. When
professional medical standards clash with patients' preferences, the latter
are generally supposed to prevail.4
Much of the law of bioethics has been about the patient's right to
refuse treatment that doctors recommend. An illuminating example is end-
of-life decision making. One sign of how much things have changed is
that the history of that issue has been forgotten. Earlier in our lifetimes,
the conventional view was that doctors had to sustain human life as long as
medically possible.5 In the last few decades, however, refusing life-
sustaining treatment has gone from seeming like a kind of suicide to "death
with dignity" by exercising the "right to die." The law's program has
become helping patients to stop treatment, not keeping them from dying
prematurely. For example, it has become public policy to encourage
patients to write "advance directives" that are supposed to allow them to
decide prospectively what treatment they would want should they be
seriously ill and incompetent to make their own decisions.6 The
assumption is that the advance directive usually will require ending
treatment.
Some of this legal movement has been through case law, some through
statutes. But, significantly, much has been through constitutional law.
From Quinlan7 on, courts have said patients have some kind of
3 See Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions
(Oxford 1998).
4 See Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 Ariz St L J 1091, 1091 (1998) ('"Patient
autonomy' is now accepted as the gold standard for ethical decision-making when recommended care
conflicts with a patient's wishes.").
5 For a review of the relevant law and culture, see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views
Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 Minn L Rev 969, 979-980 (1958). For a review of
law at the end of life as it was and is, see Marsha Garrison and Carl E. Schneider, The Law of
Bioethics: Individual Autonomy and Social Regulation 190-325 (West 2003); Carl E. Schneider, The
Road to Glucksberg, in Carl E. Schneider, ed, Law at the End of Life: The Supreme Court and Assisted
Suicide 11 (University of Michigan 2000).
6 See, for example, the Patient Self Determination Act, 42 USC § 1395cc(a) (2000).
7 In the Matter ofKaren Quinlan, 355 A2d 647,662-64 (NJ 1976).
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constitutional right to refuse treatment even if refusal means death.
Bouvia8 exemplifies this tendency: "The right to refuse medical treatment
is basic and fundamental. It is recognized as a part of the right of privacy
protected by both the state and federal constitutions. . . . Moreover, ...
there is no practical or logical reason to limit the exercise of this right to
'terminal' patients." 9 The Supreme Court has declined to call physician-
assisted suicide a right, but it has said refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment is a constitutionally protected liberty interest.' 0
Our third tectonic plate supports the law of health care finance.
America has two health care crises: It spends too little, and it spends too
much. Too little, because it notoriously leaves almost fifty million people
uninsured and, less notoriously, tens of millions under-insured. Too much,
because it notoriously devotes far more of its GDP (over 16 percent) than
any comparable country to health care without buying appreciably better
health."
We long for a solution to the first crisis, but we address the second.
The cost crisis is impressively intractable. Medical spending has
outstripped inflation for decades, and for decades, attempts to restrain
those costs have--essentially-failed. Some of the forces that drive prices
look irrepressible, like ever-improving (and ever-costlier) technology. But
exuberant expenditure is also built into the culture of American medicine.
Particularly salient aspects of that culture are physicians' understanding of
their duties to their patients, patients' assumptions about the care they are
entitled to, and the law's regulation of medicine.
12
It has now become public policy for the law to help change a culture of
medicine that routinizes extravagance and depreciates thrift. Managed care
was once the predominant way of promoting that policy, but the current
favorite is "consumer-driven health care" (more simply, consumerism). Its
principal tenet is that medical spending will be better controlled and
rationalized if patients pay for more treatment out-of-pocket and are told
about the costs and benefits of different treatments so they may make
thrifty choices.' 3 As the Secretary of Health and Human Services puts it,
"We have a better option, to provide [people] with reliable information
about the cost and quality of their care. When given that kind of
8 Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal Rptr 297 (Cal Ct App 2 Dist 1986).
9 Id at 301-02.
10 Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 723-28 (1997).
11 See generally Mark A. Hall, Mary Anne Bobinski, and& David Orentlicher, Health Care Law
and Ethics 43-60 (Aspen Pub, 7th ed, 2007).
12 See generally Clark C. Havighurst and Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American
Health Care, 69 L & Contemp Probs 7 (Autumn 2006) (demonstrating the systematic unfairness in way
America finances, regulates, and dispenses healthcare).
13 For general description and critique, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care at Risk: A
Critique of the Consumer-Driven Movement (Duke 2007); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of
Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 Tulane L Rev 777 (2006).
2009]
CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW
information, we know that consumers will make decisions that drive costs
down and the quality up.'
14
Consequently, employers and individuals are buying insurance with
notably higher copayments and deductibles than ever before.' 5  High-
deductible insurance is promoted by a generous tax shelter for health-
savings accounts to help defray these out-of-pocket costs. 16 In these ways,
public policy asks patients to decide whether a treatment is worth paying
for and to bear the consequences when they decide improvidently. In
short, the patient is to be the director of care financially as well as
medically.
So we have three bodies of law that developed independently. The law
of malpractice assumes that the doctor is the director of care; the law of
bioethics assumes that the patient is; the law of health care finance at first
assumed the former (under one version of managed care), or neither (under
another version of managed care), but now assumes the latter. Crucially,
treating these three bodies of law differently is increasingly difficult and
damaging. To return to our opening metaphor, these tectonic plates are
pressing tighter against each other, and something has to give. Our
principal goal is to identify this development so that it can be assessed and
managed.
We use as our example a particularly significant conflict in today's
health policy-the tension between malpractice liability and patient-driven
cost control. The law of malpractice pushes costs up, if only because the
more thorough the care, the less plausible the suit. But the policy of
consumerism is to press costs down. Consumerism attributes authority to
the patient, as the law of bioethics long has. Malpractice law keeps the
pressure on the doctor. These differences create tectonic tension.
We will study this conflict among the laws of malpractice, bioethics
and health finance through one element of that tension-the puzzle of how
the doctor should respond to a patient who says no for financial reasons.
The most acute instantiation of this conflict is a patient suing a doctor for
substandard care where the patient refused recommended care because it
seemed too expensive, even though the patient could have afforded it.
This puzzle is like a Rubik's cube-the right result is obvious, but the
14 Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Linking the Medicare Drug Premium to Beneficiaries 'Income, NY
Times (Feb 16, 2008).
15 Jason S. Lee and Laura Tollen, How Low Can You Go? The Impact of Reduced Benefits and
Increased Cost Sharing, W2 Health Aff W229, W229-30 (June 19, 2002), online at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprin/hlthaff.w2.229v1.
16 Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the
Future of American Health Care, 36 McGeorge L Rev 535, 553-54 (2005); Edward J. Larson and
Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results Afier One Year, 40
Wake Forest L Rev 1087, 1116 (2005).
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path to it is obscure. For example: A patient presents with a bad knee. 17
The doctor thinks it's a sprain, but it could be a torn ligament. If the latter,
further tearing needs to be prevented. To find out which it is, the doctor
recommends an $800 MRI scan. The patient is not poor and could find the
money. But the patient calculates that the possible benefit does not justify
the certain cost. The worst happens (this being a law professor's
hypothetical): the ligament tears. Can the patient sue for malpractice?
Surely not. What else was the doctor to do? Practically, ethically, and
legally, physicians cannot make patients accept treatment. Practically,
patients can just walk out or stay home. Ethically, the principal principle
of medical ethics is patient autonomy, the principle that patients have the
right (and perhaps even the duty) to decide what medical treatment to
accept. 18 Legally, that ethical right is embodied in the doctrine of informed
consent. And legally, treating patients against their will invites a battery or
false imprisonment suit. The entire "right to die" edifice assumes that
professional standards yield when autonomous patients refuse even the
most essential of services, however capricious their reason seems.' 9
The correct result is to absolve the doctor, yet much in the culture of
medicine and the law of malpractice is in tension with providing
suboptimal care. Ethically, patients' resources are not supposed to affect
the medical standard of care.20  The American Medical Association's
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs cheerfully announces that
"[e]thically, the standard of care cannot depend on the patient's ability to
pay."'21 Legally, malpractice law holds doctors to the profession's standard
of care, a standard that patient refusals may imperil. The standard can vary
somewhat, but not explicitly for ability to pay.22 Some tort claims can be
waived, but black-letter doctrine bars doctors from requiring patients to
17 For similar and contrasting scenarios, see Peter D. Jacobson and Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-
Directed Health Care and the Courts: Let the Buyer (And Seller) Beware, 26 Health Aff 704, 707-10
(May/June 2007); Saul Weiner, "I Can't Afford That!" Dilemmas in the Care of the Uninsured and
Underinsured, 16 J Gen Int Med 412 (2001).
'8 See generally Schneider, The Practice ofAutonomy (cited in note 3).
19 Also making the connection between the "right to die" and refusing treatment for financial
reasons, see J.F. Turner, et al, Physicians' Ethical Responsibilities Under Co-Pay Insurance: Should
Potential Fiscal Liability Become Part of Informed Consent?, 6 J Clinical Ethics 68, 72 (Spring 1995);
Christine K. Cassel, Doctors and Allocation Decisions: A New Role in the New Medicare, 10 J Health
Polit, Pol, & L 549, 552-53 (1985).
20 As one doctor (and lawyer) writes, "Customizing care on the basis of a patient's insurance
coverage is ... wrong. When patients are sick and vulnerable, they expect their physicians to be their
advocates for optimal care, not for some minimalist standard." William M. Sage, Physicians as
Advocates, 35 Houston L Rev 1529, 1533-34, 1536 (1999), quoting Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing
Care-Should We Adopt a New Ethic?, 339 New Eng J Med 397 (1998).
21 American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Retainer Practices, 3
(CEJA Report 3 - A-03) (2003).
22 The law "presumes that there is a unitary standard of care that.., physicians owe all patients..
regardless of their financial resources." E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard Of
Medical Care, 75 Cal L Rev 1719, 1725, 1757 (1987).
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waive malpractice liability.23 Some tort claims fail when plaintiffs have
assumed a risk, but while doctors may have such a defense, it is perilous
and burdensome, since it creates the "nightmare scenario', 24 of having to
convince a jury that the patient really said "no" and had really been
adequately informed.
Despite these possible liabilities, few contingency-fee lawyers will
want to sue doctors who comply with the patient's request to provide cost-
conserving care: the available defenses make large settlements or verdicts
unlikely. But the way the law frames these defenses matters because of the
prominence that doctors' perception of the law has in their relationships
with patients. We saw this a generation ago when doctors were told to
honor patients' rejection of life-sustaining treatment. Doctors invoked
liability concerns to resist patient directions they disagreed with.25  So, the
law had to tell doctors not only that their fears were unfounded, but that
they were legally and ethically obligated to honor patients' wishes to
refuse treatment. Similarly, in the consumerist era, if doctors fear that
judges and juries will not honor cost-based defenses, they will be well
armed and motivated to resist cost-driven reductions in optimal care,
especially when their own incomes may also be on the line.
Therefore, health law must somehow permit doctors to honor patients
who say no to save money. Even though this legal puzzle arises rarely and
will never be common, the lack of clarity in how the law can and should
achieve this result is a problem.26 The doctrinal route to the obvious
solution affects the burdens and standards of proof that influence how
safely a doctor may accept or anticipate a patient's no and therefore how
well doctors can cooperate with the consumerist mechanisms increasingly
favored by health care policy. And most consequentially, our analysis
teaches us something about the tectonic friction between the laws of
malpractice, bioethics, and health care finance.
II. THE GATHERING STORM
The law should recognize more clearly a patient's authority and a
doctor's leeway to limit care to conserve resources. But how, exactly?
When patients insist on saving money by choosing suboptimal treatments,
23 See notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
24 E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort
and Contract, 59 Vand L Rev 1207, 1225-26 (2006).
25 Discussing this attitude, see Mildred Z. Solomon, et al, Decisions Near the End of Life:
Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 Am J Pub Health 14, 14-15 (1993); Leonard H.
Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 15 L, Med & Health
Care 231, 231, 235-36, 240 (1987).
26 See Jacobson and Tunick, 26 Health Aff at 708 (cited in note 17) ("Currently, physicians would
be vulnerable to liability for an adverse outcome attributable to ordering suboptimal treatment."). But
see Morreim, 59 Vand L Rev at 1226 (cited in note 24) ("A strong body of case law appears to protect
physicians from liability where patients freely make informed decisions to forego care due to cost.").
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doctors are in a quandary: Should they push for "yes," or does "no" mean
"no"? Doctors may think it safer to threaten to refuse service altogether
unless a patient agrees to the best treatment. That is legal.27 But is it
ethical? Decent? Useful? Kind? Since the patient is the director of care,
perhaps doctors should just acquiesce into "no." After all, urging more
expensive treatment can be seen as unconscionably pursuing a doctor's
selfish interest in his own or his colleagues' financial benefit. But to fulfill
the duty of informed consent, perhaps doctors should press patients with
more information about the benefits of the treatment the doctor
recommends. Yet pressing information on patients could be seen as
pressuring patients to betray their true preferences.
Doctors indeed have considerable resources for cajoling or even
bullying patients into agreement. One study of doctors' responses to
hospital patients who said no described a "spectrum of forcefulness"
ranging from "forceful persuasion" (telling patients they have no choice) to
patients being "coaxed and wheedled., 28 In interviews, physicians gave
examples of pushing reluctant patients to accept treatment that ranged from
persuasion to manipulation to coercion. One doctor told a woman who
balked at a mammogram that he was scheduling one anyway. Another
called a taxi to take a patient to the hospital to prevent her from going
home. Yet another doctor enlisted family members in convincing
recalcitrant patients. Still another doctor asked a patient who was reluctant
to leave her grandchild to come in for an exam, "but who will take care of
your grandchild if you die?" In sum, doctors dance a delicate dance to
accommodate patients' ambivalent wants and ambiguous needs, and their
own. How far should doctors deploy these techniques when patients refuse
care to save money?
For decades, the law did not much care. Inability to pay was frequent
a century ago, 29 but it affected malpractice little because medicine could do
little. 30 During the century before widespread insurance (roughly 1850-
1950), most suits arose from treatment done badly, not treatment
27 See text accompanying note 139.
28 Paul S. Appelbaum and Loren H. Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospitals,
250 JAMA 1296, 1299 (1983).
29 For extensive historical reviews of the burdens of medical costs, see generally Herman Miles
Somers and Anne Ramsay Somers, Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance: The Organization and
Financing of Medical Care 208-10 (1961); Committee on Costs of Medical Care, Medical Care for the
American People (Chicago 1932).
30 As one historian summarized, in the nineteenth century "no special aids to diagnosis were
available to any physician, no therapeutics beyond bleeding, cupping, and administration of drugs.
Surgery was ordinarily limited, for rich and poor alike, to the treatment of lacerations and fractures, the
reduction of occasional dislocations, the lancing of boils and abscesses." Charles E. Rosenberg, Social
Class and Medical Care in Nineteenth-Century America: The Rise and Fall of the Dispensary, 29 J
Hist Med & Allied Sci 32,41 (1974).
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foregone. 3' Thus, in the nineteenth century, orthopedics was the greatest
source of malpractice liability-not so much because doctors failed to
mend limbs as because they aggressively and disastrously treated what had
once been left to nature's healing.32 Similarly, new sources of liability a
century ago were childbirth injuries caused by aggressive intervention,
adverse reactions to prescription drugs, and burns from x-rays.33 Before
modem medicine, treatments were not especially expensive. Therefore,
patients who could afford care had less reason than now to say no because
of cost. When they did, they were hard pressed to show that they were
worse off.
Since the 1970s, however, most patients have been insured for most
medical costs. 34  Insurance has helped make litigation for omitted
treatments more common. For example, suits now allege that doctors
failed to use expensive diagnostic technologies, technologies that insurance
has largely paid for. As technology proliferates while insurance shrinks,
doctors increasingly find patients unwilling to pay for measures they
recommend. Nevertheless, in modem times, courts have not had to ask
whether medical standards may vary according to willingness to pay
because, for roughly half a century, most medical services have been
mostly insured for most patients.35 Thus neither patients nor physicians
have had much economic reason to selectively limit care.36
Resource questions are especially likely where uninsured patients are
indigent. For the law to tell poor patients that "you get what you pay for"
would mean imposing virtually no lower limit on a doctor's performance.
37
31 See Andrew A. Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United States, 163
JAMA 459, 465 (1957) ("Orthopedic problems accounted for 90% of all reported cases to 1900, and
still heads the list as one of the major professional liability hazards.").
32 Kenneth DeVille, Medical Malpractice in Twentieth Century United States: The Interaction of
Technology, Law, and Culture, 14 Intl J Tech Assess in Health Care 197, 199-200 (1998); Kenneth
Allen DeVille, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America: Origins and Legacy 24, 32 (NYU
1990).
33 See Neal C. Hogan, Unhealed Wounds: Medical Malpractice in the Twentieth Century 99, 103-
04 (LFB 2003).
34 Health insurance covered more than half of hospital costs beginning in the 1950s. Ronald
Andersen and Odin W. Anderson, A Decade of Health Services: Social Survey Trends In Use and
Expenditure 92 (University of Chicago Press 1967). Insurance covered more than half of physicians'
costs beginning in the late 1960s. Paul J. Feldstein, Health Care Economics 251-52 (Delmar 5th ed
1999).
35 In support, see Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 Yale L J 1297, 1317 (1994).
36 Cassel, 10 J Health Polit, Pol & L at 551 (cited in note 19) (arguing that because of insurance,
as "more expensive interventions became available, the financial constraints on their use were
removed").
37 See Becker vJaninski, 15 NYS 675, 677 (1891).
Whether the patient be a pauper or a millionaire, whether he be treated gratuitously or for
reward, the physician owes him precisely the same measure of duty, and the same degree of
skill and care. He may decline to respond to the call of a patient unable to compensate him;
but if he undertake the treatment of such a patient, he cannot defeat a suit for malpractice, nor
mitigate a recovery against him, upon the principle that the skill and care required of a
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Judges are loath to have tort law ratify the social injustice of unaffordable
health care.38  Although some nineteenth-century courts lowered the
liability standard from negligence to gross negligence for charity care,
others did not.39  And in the twentieth century, courts have rejected
charitable immunity for hospitals.40
"Bargaining" for half a loaf of care means little if the only alternative
is no loaf. When this situation affected only a few patients, it seemed
practical to set a standard of care that applied to the great majority of suits.
Since most suits were brought by insured patients, the default rule treated
all patients as if money were no object. 41 True, this elevated standard may
have deterred physicians from taking on indigent patients or helping
strangers in distress, but courts have assumed that physicians would
respond out of a sense of professional obligation.
In short, during the golden age of health insurance, resource issues
rarely affected malpractice cases. But when they did, courts sometimes let
resource constraints justify sub-optimal care. Two such cases involved
public institutions with exiguous budgets, and both recognized that
resources influence the standard of care. In Moss v Miller, a prisoner
alleged that the prison doctor had negligently failed to refer him to a
specialist for an eye injury. A jury instruction and a lawyer's closing
statement suggested that prison doctors are subject to a lower standard of
care. The appellate court disagreed. Doctors in penitentiaries "are held to
the same standard of care as [other doctors]. To hold otherwise would be
to abandon reason and common sense." Nevertheless, the court
acknowledged that the prison's scanty resources "may well have a negative
effect on the ability to deliver medical services." And the court held that
prison doctors "should not be held liable for injuries resulting from these
physician are proportioned to his expectation of pecuniary recompense. Such a rule would be
of the most mischievous consequence; would make the health and life of the indigent the sport
of reckless experiment and cruel indifference.
Id at 677.
38 See Notes, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 Harv L
Rev 1004, 1018-19 (1985) ("Courts, meanwhile, have been reluctant to second-guess the profession's
standards, and on the rare occasions that they have done so, it has been to impose a higher standard.").
" Becker, 15 NYS at 677 ("Even though [ ] the defendant was not to be paid for his attendance,
he was still bound in law to treat the plaintiff with the requisite skill and the requisite care.").
40 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v Hughes, 130 F2d 810, 814, 827 (DDC
Cir 1942) (observing that "[tihe rule of immunity is out of step with the general trend of legislative and
judicial policy"). Physicians rarely have the gumption to claim charitable immunity, but when they do,
they too are denied. University of Virginia Health Services Foundation v Morris, Va, 657 SE2d 512,
522 (Va 2008). Also, courts have consistently ruled that physicians undertake a duty of care even when
they receive no consideration. Elmer D. Brothers, Medical Jurisprudence: A Statement of the Law of
Forensic Medicine 146 (CV Mosby 1914); P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort
Boundary, 49 L & Contemp Probs 287, 289 (Spring 1986).
41 E. Haavi Morreim aptly refers to this as the law's "artesian" standard, referring to a seemingly
bottomless well of medical resources. E. Haavi Morreim, Holding Health Care Accountable 86, 93
(Oxford 2001).
42 625 NE2d 1044, 1047 (111 App Ct 1993).
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constraints. 43 In other words, as we read the case, the prison doctor was
not liable for substandard care caused by scarce resources but was obliged
to practice as skillfully as resources permitted.
Rogers v Okin spoke even more sympathetically about how resources
could limit liability. 44 Was it "reasonable medical practice" for doctors in
a state psychiatric hospital to use psychotropic medication so much? The
court thought it was relevant "to consider the medical resources and
support facilities available to the defendants at the Boston State Hospital."
Its "resources were barely adequate." It dealt primarily "with the most
disturbed and potentially violent patients, those for whom local mental
health clinics could not care." Its salaries "were not competitive with
private institutions such as McLean's Hospital." State hospitals like it
often had half "the staff-patient ratio of private hospitals."45 And the care
its doctors could provide was limited in ways the doctors could not control.
"Like front line surgeons, they were required to work with what they had."
The court agreed with the American Psychiatric Association that it would
be "unjust and unreasonable . . . to hold psychiatrists personally and
individually responsible for resource deficiencies that are actually the
responsibility of society. Such a decision would only deter qualified
psychiatrists from working in the very setting where they are most
needed.4
6
These two cases have never been judicially followed, discussed, or
contradicted. They are sui generis. Tangentially relevant are a few
decisions that make medical resources relevant in deciding which local
circumstances to consider in determining the prevailing standard of care
under the "similar locality" rule. These decisions generally mention
medical resources only in passing, and most refer to the availability of
medical facilities and equipment.47 Other decisions depreciate resource
48considerations. Nor were resource considerations relevant to the law's
41 Id at 1051.
"478 F Supp 1342, 1384 (D Mass 1979), affd in relevant part, rev'd in other respects, Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F2d 650 (Ct App Mass, 1980).
41 Id at 1384 & n 60. The court added: "In addition to staffing deficiencies, the May and Austin
physical plants were anything but models. Their heating systems were archaic and unreliable. Seeping
steam caused cracked and peeling paint. Inadequate lighting cast a gloomy pall. Their horse trough
type bathing facilities were termed 'Dickensian'...." Id at 1385.
Id at 1385 (footnote omitted).
47 The leading decision is Hall v Hilbun, 466 So2d 856, 873 (Miss 1985) ("[The physician's duty
of care must take into consideration the quality and kind of facilities, services, equipment and other
resources available."). See also Primus v Galgano, 329 F3d 236, 241 (lst Cir 2003) ("[UIt is
permissible to consider the medical resources available to the physician as one circumstance in
determining the skill and care required."), quoting Brune v Belinkoff, 235 NE2d 793 (Mass 1968). Hall
v Hilbun has been widely influential in health law casebooks and academic commentary, but has rarely
been cited by courts for this point.
48 For instance, Moss v Miller, 625 NE2d 1044, 1051 (111 App Ct 1993), discussed in text at note
1456, rejected the consideration of limited resources in prisons under the similar locality standard.
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original adoption of the locality standard of medical liability.49
Legislatures have been similarly quiet or ambivalent. Some states
have shielded physicians from personal liability when they serve low-
income patients, but only when working in designated indigent-care
clinics.50 Many states have reduced liability from negligence to gross
negligence for "Good Samaritan" physicians (who respond to emergencies
without expecting payment),5 but the primary purpose is not shielding
doctors for harms caused by patients' restricted resources. A Medicare
statute provides some immunity to physicians who comply with practice
guidelines aimed at reducing costs. 52 However, doctors must exercise "due
care in all professional conduct taken . . . in compliance with or reliance
upon such" guidelines, which clouds the statute's meaning and blunts its
significance.53 Perhaps for these reasons, the statute has never been tested
in a reported decision.54
Malpractice law began to encounter the cost-control campaign a
quarter-century ago. Managed care was then the principal way costs of
medical care were to be contained and its quality improved. This raised an
inevitable question: If HMOs or government insurers limit payments, may
doctors and hospitals reduce proportionately the quality of their services?
This question has garnered volumes-more academic analysis than judicial
attention. Dozens of articles debated how courts should respond to
managed care;55 only a few courts spoke. 56 There are several reasons.
49 See DeVille, 14 Intl J Tech Assess in Health Care at 199 (cited in note 32).
so Paul A. Hattis, Overcoming Barriers to Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State Laws
Providing Reduced Malpractice Liability Exposure for Clinician Volunteers, 2004 U 111 L Rev 167, 168
(2004); John L. Brown, Note, Statutory Immunity for Volunteer Physicians: A Vehicle for
Reaffirmation of the doctor's Beneficent Duties-Absent the Rights Talk, I Widener L Symp J 425, 428
(1996).
51 Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Good Samaritan" Statutes,
68 ALR4th 294, 307 (1989).
" 42 USC § 1320c-6(c).
53 See Leah S. Crothers, Note, Professional Standards Review and the Limitation of Services: An
Interpretation of the Effect of Statutory Immunity on Medical Malpractice Liability, 54 BU L Rev 931,
934-35 (1974) ("Because statutory immunity is conditioned upon the exercise of due care,
opportunities still exist for the imposition of common law liabilities upon a physician or provider who
has nevertheless complied with [the guidelines].") (footnote omitted); Kenneth W. Kleinman,
Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 Georgetown L
J 1499, 1506 (1974) ("Unless [the guideline] standards are both specific and encompassing and
constitute a codification of the standard of care rather than merely review screening criteria, the
immunity provision is meaningless.").
54 Also, Medicare agencies and contractors have in fact issued almost no cost-containment
guidelines despite this encouragement. See James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-
Setting: Developing Malpractice "Safe Harbors " As a New Role for QIOs?, 59 Vand L Rev 1017,
1039-41 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 L & Contemp Probs 119, 136-38 (Spring 1991)
" In 1975, Randall Bovbjerg wrote the definitive analytical work on the application of
malpractice doctrine to HMOs, Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs
and Customary Practice, 1975 Duke L J 1375. In 1981, the Texas Law Review published a lengthy
debate among James Blumstein, Rand Rosenblatt, and Peter Schuck about precisely this issue. James
F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 Tex L
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First, managed care was not as tenacious as some had feared and others
had hoped. Bludgeoned by the market and eviscerated by regulation,57
managed care never really penetrated the "no man's land"58 of cutting costs
for clearly beneficial care.59  Second, defense lawyers prudently avoided
raising insurer-imposed economizing as a defense lest their clients seemed
more concerned for their purses than their patients.6 ° (Financial issues
more often have been raised by plaintiffs pressing for punitive damages.) 6'
Finally, ERISA pre-empts suits against employer-funded managed care
organizations,62 which accounts for most private insurance, and ERISA
itself imposes no obstacle to rationing care.63 The few remaining arenas
where suits might have arisen produced, for various technical reasons, no
Rev 1345 (198 1); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal'" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59
Tex L Rev 1401 (1981); Peter H. Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 Tex L
Rev 1421 (1981). More recently, see, for example, E. Haavi Morreim, Holding Health Care
Accountable at 33-34 (cited in note 41); Frankel, Note, 103 Yale L J 1297 (cited in note 35); Maxwell
J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to
Treat?, 25 Conn L Rev 349 (1993); Laura Athens Mellas, Adapting the Judicial Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims Against Physicians to Reflect Medicare Cost Containment Measures, 62 U Colo L
Rev 287 (1991); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77
Va L Rev 439 (1991); Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment,
17 L, Med & Health Care 347 (1989); Andrea Jean Lairson, Comment, Reexamining the Physician's
Duty of Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 62 Wash L Rev 791, 803 (1987);
Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice: On a Collision
Course, 21 Suffolk U L Rev 91, 118 (1987); Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost
Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 Case W Res L Rev 985 (1986); Frank H. Marsh, Health Care
Cost Containment and the Duty to Treat, 6 J Leg Med 157, 169 (1985); Note, Rethinking Medical
Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 Harv L Rev 1004 (1985); Marshall B. Kapp,
Legal and Ethical Implications of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 L,
Med & Health Care 245, 252 (1984).
56 See Peter Jacobson, Strangers in the Night: Law and Medicine in the Managed Care Era 138-
53, 177-83 (Oxford 2002).
17 Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J Health Polit, Pol, & L
427 (2005).
58 Clark C. Havighurst and James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical
Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw U L Rev 6, 63 (1975).
59 See generally Symposium, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?, 65 L & Contemp Probs 1
(Autumn 2002) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of managed care).
60 Mark A. Hall and Gail Agrawal, The Impact of State Managed Care Liability Statutes, 22
Health Aff 138, 143-44 (2003).
61 It is noteworthy, though, that courts have resisted this move lest focusing on financial
motivation unduly prejudice juries against doctors. For example, Shea v Esensten, 622 NW2d 130, 136
(Minn Ct App 2001) ("[I]n the absence of any plausible link between the financial evidence and the
patient's treatment, the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence."); Madsen v Park Nicollet Medical Center, 419 NW2d 511, 515 (Minn Ct App 1988)
(finding financial motive evidence "only marginally relevant, and potentially very prejudicial"), revd
on other grounds by 431 NW2d 855 (Minn 1988). But see Neade v Portes, 739 NE2d 496 (111 2000)
(finding 'issues concerning [treating physcian's] financial gain go to his credibility'). See generally
Paul R. Sugarman and Valerie A. Yarasbus, Admissibility of Managed Care Financial Incentives in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 34 Tort & Ins L J 735 (1999).62 Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200 (2004).
63 See Pegram v Herdrich, 530 US 211, 220, 233-34 (2000) (finding that Congress has supported
HMO practices which necessarily include "some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment
rationing").
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definitive judicial position on whether tort law allows medical standards to
bend to insurers' cost constraints.
64
In sum, malpractice law has not developed good ways to handle
resource problems, and there is cause to worry whether it leaves the world
safe for consumerism. So we next search for solutions to that problem.
We first investigate two immediately plausible solutions-waiver of
liability and assumption of risk. We conclude that both describe
reasonable justifications for doctors to say yes to patients who say no"
but both these solutions place too great a burden on doctors to justify their
decision and on juries to evaluate it. We then learn that law deals handily
with the same problems in legal malpractice by recognizing lawyers'
ability to tailor services to clients' means. We adapt that solution to the
medical problem. Briefly, law should regard the resource component of
the legal standard as a matter of contract (so that doctors may safely say
yes to patients who say no). Only the skill and care component should
give rise to fiduciary-based tort scrutiny. We close with some lessons our
example teaches about the tectonic collisions in the law of health care.
III. THE PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS: WAIVER AND ASSUMPTION OF
RISK
The simplest solution to our puzzle is that penny-pinching patients
either waive claims for harms resulting from treatments they refuse or
assume the risk of such harms. 65  Both solutions state plausible reasons
doctors might say yes to patients who reject even good advice. However,
neither solution works well enough.
A. Parsing the Doctrine
Contractual waiver and express assumption of risk are the legal
theories hospitals recruit when they ask patients to acknowledge that they
are leaving against medical advice ("A.M.A."). 66  This practice is
commonplace,67 and costs are one reason patients sometimes leave
64 For example, Neade, 739 NE2d 496 (refusing to recognize a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty, separate from simple medical negligence, created by an HMO physician's conflict of
interest); Muse v Charter Hospital of Winston-Salem, Inc, 452 SE2d 589 (NC Ct App 1995) (finding
hospital liable for interfering with physician's medical judgment by requiring psychiatric patient to be
discharged when his insurance ran out); Wickline v State, 239 Cal Rptr 810 (Cal Ct App 1986) (finding
no issue presented on medical negligence when Medicaid limited hospital stay to four rather than eight
days because plaintiff's expert, who was also the treating physician, testified that four days was not
substandard). Several juries have awarded very large punitive damages against HMOs for denying
necessary care, but these decisions were not appealed. Hall, Bobinski, and Orentlicher at 316 (cited in
note 1i).
65 See generally Morreim, 75 Cal L Rev at 1753-55 (cited at note 22).
66 See generally Admitting and Discharge, in Hospital Law Manual, § 4-12 at 54 (Aspen 1992).
67 See Saul N. Weingart, Roger B. Davis and Russell S. Phillips, Patients Discharged Against
Medical Advice From a General Medicine Service, 13 J Gen Int Med 568 (1998); David Barton Smith
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hospitals early.68 So can the A.M.A. precedent resolve the dilemma of
patients who say no to save money? It cannot.
First, an A.M.A. discharge means terminating treatment, not
continuing it suboptimally. A.M.A. forms are used to deter suits alleging
that a hospital has abandoned its patient, not to alter or waive the standard
of care. Ending treatment is a clean legal resolution because it abrogates
both the contractual basis of the treatment relationship and any provider
duty.
Second, even if A.M.A. forms worked legal magic, many physicians
would rightly reject them. Responding to medicine's first malpractice
crisis, some nineteenth-century doctors conditioned treatment on bonded
promises not to sue. This worked legally, but it faded away because
professional societies thought it hurt the doctor-patient relationship.
69
Similarly, some primary-care physicians we interviewed knew it might be
legally effective to ask refusing patients to sign liability-waiver forms, but
they rarely did so (except to make a point with a recalcitrant patient)
because it seemed confrontational. Instead, they usually noted the patient's
refusal and reasoning in the chart. Our observations are consistent with the
largest study of treatment refusals in hospitals, which found that, of 105
hospital patients refusing at least one item of treatment, only one such
patient "actually signed out [A.M.A.],
70
When the patient who says no to costly care is still the doctor's patient,
has the patient waived liability by saying no? Or, has the patient assumed
the risk? Either claim makes sense, but they share a defect. Each is an
affirmative defense, so doctors must prove its exacting elements.
Therefore, affirmative defenses rarely keep a malpractice case from the
jury. For instance, in suits by Jehovah's Witnesses where surgeries went
badly after patients refused blood transfusions, courts have hesitated to
allow assumption of risk as a pre-emptive defense. Instead they want
juries to sort out whether the harm was due to lack of blood or to the
doctor's surgical negligence.7'
and Joel Leon Telles, Discharges Against Medical Advice At Regional Acute Care Hospitals, 81 Am J
Pub Health 212 (1991).
68 See Patricia Green, et al, Why Patients Sign Out Against Medical Advice (AM): Factors
Motivating Patients to Sign Out AM4, 30 Am J Drug & Alcohol Abuse 489, 491 (2004) (the majority
of patients at one hospital who left early did so for personal reasons including financial obligations); Zy
Aliyu, Discharge Against Medical Advice: Sociodemographic, Clinical and Financial Perspectives, 56
Intl J Clinical Practice 325 (2002) (patients without health insurance are more likely to leave early);
Julie E. Connelly and Courtney Campbell, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Offices, 147
Archives hat Med 1829, 1831-32 (1987) (costs were reason for refusing recommended treatments in
two of twenty-three cases studied).
69 DeVille, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America at 178-81 (cited in note 32).
70 Paul S. Appelbaum and Loren H. Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospitals,
250 JAMA 1296, 1299-1300 (1983).
71 For example, Estate ofReinen v Northern Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd, 9 P3d 314 (Ariz 2000);
Corlett v Caserta, 562 NE2d 257 (I11 App Ct 1990).
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The defenses of waiver or assumption of risk expose a doctor to
unsettling legal uncertainty. But so what? In tort law, controverted facts
and conflicting equities are standard, as are unpredictable juries. What is
special here, though, is that, if doctors are to accommodate themselves to
the cost-control project that is now public policy, doctors need clearer
ethical guidance and firmer legal defenses when patients say no to save
money.
Furthermore-and this is critical-good doctors do not see the
patient's "no" in isolation. Rather, they see it in terms of their entire
relationship with the patient. That is, good doctors look not just at any
single treatment; they look at their overall ability to help a patient. This is
what doctors regularly do. Patients all the time choose substandard care,
they just don't do it explicitly. They do it by failing to comply with
treatments to which they have nominally agreed.72 Doctors who refused to
treat patients who tacitly insisted on substandard care would keep few
patients.
Courts in similar malpractice contexts caution against liability rules
that encourage doctors to coerce or abandon patients. For instance, in
Newell v Corres the court overturned a verdict for a patient whose jaw
failed to heal because he refused to have it wired shut.73 The trial court had
"ignored the dilemma confronting a physician" when a patient who needs
immediate care refuses standard treatment: "If the physician advises the
patient to 'go elsewhere,' he risks potential liability for abandoning his
patient; if he provides an 'adequate,' albeit less than ideal, treatment, as
here, he can also incur malpractice liability.
74
Similarly, Forman v. Pillsbury75 overturned a verdict in favor of a
patient who died from a toxic drug reaction that was not caught in time,
stating: "A doctor cannot compel a patient to come to the office for
treatment, nor can a doctor force a patient to follow his recommendations
outside the office. In fact, few patients would appreciate the type of
paternalistic intrusiveness plaintiffs proposed rule requires. ' '76  And
Shorter v Drury held that a release signed by a Jehovah's Witness patient
who refused a blood transfusion was not against public policy because the
72 See E. Vermeire, et al, Patient Adherence to Treatment: Three Decades of Research. A
Comprehensive Review, 26 J Clinical Pharmacy & Therapeutics 331, 334 (2001) ("[P]oor compliance
is to be expected in 30-50% of all patients, irrespective of disease, prognosis or setting.").
"' 466 NE2d 1085, 1090 (I11 App Ct 1984).
74 Id (citation omitted).
75 753 F Supp 14 (D DC 1990).
76 Id at 19. Similarly, in Mecham v McLeay, 227 NW2d 829, 832 (Neb 1975), the court allowed a
contributory negligence defense (in a case involving delay in diagnosing anemia) based on a patient's
failure to return for a follow-up appointment, noting that, otherwise, "we would be required to say that
[the physician] had a duty, in some indefinable method by coercion, threats, or pressure to prevail upon




only alternative was for doctors and hospitals to refuse care altogether
based on patients' religious beliefs.77
It has become public policy to change the culture of medicine, to
encourage doctors to offer thrifty care, and to place patients under an
economic gun to consider costs in evaluating tests and treatments. What
role should courts play in such a transition? Should they try to calibrate
doctors' affirmative defenses to malpractice claims to protect patients
during the transition? The short answer is that doing so may keep doctors
from responding appropriately to the changing world in which they work.
Here, the best truly is the enemy of the good.
For instance, E. Haavi Morreim argues for a "best": that a physician in
a managed-care organization who invokes a resources defense in
malpractice litigation should "be required specifically to demonstrate the
nature and severity of his fiscal constraints., 78 Morreim's standards of
specificity are onerous. The demonstration could include, for example:
"providing information about the hospital's overall economic situation, its
uncompensated care burden, the needs of the plaintiff-patient compared
with other patients' needs at the time, the policies developed within the
hospital and elsewhere to cope with fiscal limits, and perhaps even the
pressures that have been personally applied to the physician-defendant."'7 9
Apparently recognizing the agonies of proving all this, Morreim thinks
that "some new rules of discovery might be needed, along with more
detailed legal specification of the physician's burdens of evidence and
persuasion." And that is not all: "The physician should further
demonstrate that alternatives to the substandard care were not readily
available. 8°
The arguments for the best-for active common-law supervision of the
changing culture of medicine-are obvious. They are the arguments for
malpractice liability itself. There are many reasons doctors might provide
inadequate care. Malpractice liability is supposed to deter doctors from
falling below the standard and to compensate patients who have been
injured by doctors who do fall below it. If the law frets too much about
other policies, the basic purposes of malpractice law may be thwarted.
Nevertheless, we have here a kind of situation that is more common
than lawyers like to think-one in which finely-tuned defenses and
burdens of proof are too clumsy to work decently during a period of
institutional and cultural change. For the policy of making patients
" 695 P2d 116, 121 (1985).
78 Morreim, 75 Cal L Rev at 1757 (cited in note 24).
'9 Id
go Still not all: "[A]n adequate rebuttal to the presumption of standard care would require that the
physician demonstrate not only that his resources are limited, but also that he and his institution are
making good use of the resources they do have." Id at 1757-58, 1762.
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consumers to succeed, doctors must be able to accept or anticipate "no"
without undue danger. The kind of legal regime Morreim and others
advocate prevent doctors from accommodating the new world of patients
as economic as well as medical directors of care.
Waiver and assumption of risk have another defect. Even when one of
these defenses is established, some courts recognize only a partial defense,
one that apportions the liability baby.8' Interestingly illustrative is Newell.
A young man whose jaw was broken in a mugging refused to have his
mouth wired shut for six weeks and instead chose treatment that let him eat
and speak. It failed. He sued. He won a directed verdict because no
expert would say the alternative treatment met the standard of care. The
appellate court reversed and allowed the doctor to defend his
"substandard" care by showing the patient's own "negligence" in refusing
the better treatment. However, "under comparative negligence principles a
patient's refusal may not be a complete defense, it is a factor to be weighed
by the jury in determining the relative degree of negligence attributable to
the parties. 82 But what doctor will want to predict how juries will make
such decisions?
Assumption of risk has yet another defect. Patients may not assume a
risk unless they understand it. Some cases set a mountainous hurdle for
proving that a patient was adequately informed.83 If courts rigorously
apply informed-consent law to assumption of risk, "[o]nly in rare
circumstances would a patient be considered to have assumed the risk of
negligent medical treatment"84 because "most patients' knowledge of
medicine does not permit them to understand these risks."85 This is why
most successful assumption-of-risk defenses involve treatments with pretty
obvious perils, like refusing blood transfusions during surgery or trying
unorthodox cancer treatment.
81 See, for example, Charell v Gonzalez, 251 AD2d 72, 673 NYS.2d 685 (NY App Div 1998)
(affirming verdict that reduced physician's liability 49 percent because a cancer patient opted for
nutritional therapy rather than radiation and chemotherapy); Shorter, 695 P2d 116 (affirming jury's
reduction of liability by 75 percent for Jehovah's Witness who had refused blood transfusion).
Apportionment of liability is even more likely in jurisdictions that have merged assumption of risk into
a more general approach to comparative fault that also includes contributory negligence. For instance,
courts sometimes apportion liability when patients fail to return for follow-up appointments. See, for
example, Mecham, 227 NW2d 829. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Contributory
Negligence, Comparative Negligence, or Assumption of Risk, Other than Failing to Reveal Medical
History or Follow Instructions, as Defense in Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Medical
Malpractice, 108 ALR5th 385 (2003).
82 466 NE2d at 1090.
83 See the discussion below of Truman v Thomas, 611 P2d 902, 906-07 (Cal 1980) in the text
accompanying notes 102-19.
8 Sharon W. Murphy, Comment, Contributory Negligence in Medical Malpractice: Are the
Standards Changing to Reflect Society's Growing Health Care Consumerism?, 17 U Dayton L Rev
151,162 (1991).
85 Angela Roddey Holder, Medical Malpractice Law 310 (Wiley 1978).
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Waiver law makes it even harder for a doctor to establish a defense.86
In an influential decision, the California Supreme Court said a hospital
may not exempt itself "from any standard of due care. 87 Scholars have
debated at length whether, short of complete immunity, parties to a
medical transaction may alter the standard of care, as by reducing liability
from a negligence to a gross-negligence standard.88 Pointing to cases that
enforce agreements to arbitrate medical disputes,89 some scholars argue
that accepting lower-cost insurance amounts to agreeing to a lower
standard of care. 90 These arguments are untested in the courts. Even if
they made sense under managed-care insurance, they make little sense for
dealings between individual patients and doctors. 9' Managed-care
contracts are negotiated by large institutions before the need for treatment.
Bedsides, negotiations with individual patients look much more like the
contracts of adhesion that lead courts to call tort waivers unconscionable or
contrary to public policy.
92
B. Illustrating Problems with the Doctrine
We have been arguing that the two obvious solutions to our doctrinal
puzzle-waiver of suit and assumption of risk-look doctrinally plausible
but turn out to make it too risky for doctors to say yes to patients who say
no. Why does this matter? Why not make doctors explain themselves to
juries and accept whatever responsibility for the bad outcome the jury
thinks is just? After all, juries do not seem to be hostile to doctors.9 3
We have given two kinds of answers to that question. First,
malpractice law should not impede the patient-directed economies the
policy of cost control now tries to promote. Second, when the patient is
the director of care, actual doctors dealing with actual patients face such a
battery of tactical and ethical problems that the law is little able to evaluate
intelligently a doctor's acceptance of a patient's no.
Two well-known cases illustrate the points we have just made. They
show how the waiver and assumption-of-risk defenses keep malpractice
86 For a review of the cases, see William H. Ginsburg et al, Contractual Revisions to Medical
Malpractice Liability, 49 L & Contemp Probs 253 (Spring 1986).
87 Tunkl v Regents of University of California, 383 P2d 441,448 (Cal 1963).
88 See, for example, Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market
Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 L & Contemp Probs 143 (Spring 1986).
89 For example, Madden v Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 552 P2d 1178 (Cal 1976).
90 For example, Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care Choices: Private Contracts as Instruments of
Health Reform (AEI 1995).
9' See Jacobson and Tunick, 26 Health Aff at 708 (cited in note 17).
92 See generally Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 542 (West 2000); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 496B (ALl 2008); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 2, comment (e)
(2000). See also Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich L Rev 643 (2008), which discusses unconscionability in the
context of negotiating payment terms for medical care.
93 Philip G. Peters, Doctors & Juries, 105 Mich L Rev 1453 (2007).
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law from comporting with consumerist policies. And they show how
challenging it is for legal institutions to write rules that will guide doctors'
decisions and judge their actions appropriately, or even intelligibly, in the
complex human and medical situation when patients say no to save money.
Our first example is Schneider v Revici.94 A breast-cancer patient
sought out Dr. Revici because he used "non-invasive methods that have not
been adopted by the medical community." He agreed to treat her with
selenium and diet.95 She signed a waiver that said, "I fully understand that
some of the treatment procedures and medications are still investigatory
awaiting further research and submission for F.D.A. approval .... I am
aware that the practice of medicine is not an exact science and I
acknowledge that no guaranties have been made to me as to the results of
the treatment procedures and medications. . . . I therefore release Dr.
Emanuel Revici from all liabilities to me .... I am here because I wish to
try the Revici methods and preparations for disease control. 96
The treatment failed, and "Mrs. Schneider finally underwent a bilateral
mastectomy at Sloan-Kettering . . . followed by sixteen months of
conventional chemotherapy." She sued.9 7 The court held that "[t]he form
signed by Mrs. Schneider lacks the precision required by New York law"
to qualify as a covenant not to sue. Although the trial court had erred in
refusing to "allow the jury to consider express assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense,"98 the court permitted the defense only to the extent of
instructing the jury, even though the patient had signed an explicit waiver
of liability.99
Dr. Revici's version of the story suggests how perplexing the doctor's
situation can be when patients exercise their now-undoubted right to make
their own treatment decisions. Mrs. Schneider had apparently come to Dr.
Revici after hearing him discuss his therapy on the radio. He was
avowedly a doctor who used "'non-toxic,' non-invasive methods that have
not been adopted by the medical community." He had her sign "a detailed
consent form" in which she said she fully understood "that some of the
treatment procedures and medications are still investigatory awaiting
further research and submission for F.D.A. approval." Dr. Revici testified
that he had discussed "every point" with Mrs. Schneider because he knew
94 817 F2d 987 (2d Cir 1987).
9' Id at 989-90. Although Dr. Revici was called a "quack," subsequent studies have shown that
some version of his treatment in fact inhibits several types of cancer. In one study, the compound he
used cut cancer deaths in half. The benefit was so dramatic, the researchers felt compelled to halt the
placebo wing of the study. Graham Colditz, Selenium and Cancer Prevention: Promising Results
Indicate Further Trials Required, 276 JAMA 1984 (1996).
96 Revici, 817 F2d at 21 n 1.97 Id at 990.
9' Id at 993, 996.
9 The same court reached a similar outcome in a case involving the same doctor but where there
was no waiver/consent form. See Boyle v Revici, 961 F2d 1060 (2d Cir 1992).
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"that Mrs. Schneider was not telling me the truth when she told me that...
she didn't see any other doctor before me . . . ." She had also apparently
falsely told him that she had not had a mammogram. Finally, his records
showed (although she denied it) that he had advised her four times to "have
the tumor surgically removed."' °
Assuming these facts are true, what should Dr. Revici have done? He
had a patient who had come to him because she wanted the kind of care he
offered. He had reason to think she was not being honest with him, as
many patients are not with their doctors. He advised her to have
conventional treatment but continued to provide the treatment she
preferred. He went through the legal forms as best he knew how. In
retrospect, he would have been better off firing her as a patient. Is this
what the law should be encouraging him to do, in a world of patient rights
and consumer choice?
For a yet fuller sense of how the law confounds the professional and
human situation behind the doctrines we have been discussing, we re-
examine a famous case-Truman v Thomas.l0' First, the California
Supreme Court's version of the facts. 10 2 Dr. Thomas was Mrs. Truman's
primary physician for six years. He repeatedly urged her to have a pap
smear, but he never explicitly told her the risks of not having one. In
October 1969, a gynecologist discovered that Mrs. Truman had cervical
cancer. Within a year, she died. At trial, "expert testimony was presented
which indicated that if Mrs. Truman had undergone a pap smear at any
time between 1964 and 1969, the cervical tumor probably would have been
discovered in time to save her life."'
0 3
The jury's special verdict found Dr. Thomas "free of any negligence
that proximately caused Mrs. Truman's death." 1°4 The California Supreme
Court, however, reversed, essentially because the plaintiffs were entitled to
an instruction telling the jury that it "could reasonably conclude that Dr.
Thomas had a duty to inform Mrs. Truman of the danger of refusing the
test because it was not reasonable for Dr. Thomas to assume that Mrs.
Truman appreciated the potentially fatal consequences of her conduct.'
0 5
The Court of Appeal's more detailed facts suggest how harsh Dr.
Thomas's problem was. He was presumably not looking just at the pap
smear issue. Rather, it was just one of many things he was trying to
accomplish with Mrs. Truman. And considering the pap smear alone, he
had to find the best way to induce her to cooperate, despite her enduring
'0o 817 F2d at 989-90 & n 1.
101 611 P2d 902 (Cal 1980).
102 Given the procedural posture of the case, the court interpreted the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs.
103 Truman, 611 P2d at 904.
04 Id at 905.
'0' Id at 907.
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resistance.
Mrs. Truman first consulted Dr. Thomas for care in her second
pregnancy. She said she had had a pap smear within the past year. Dr.
Thomas told her on many occasions to have a pap smear, but she
persistently declined or procrastinated: "As I said many times with Rena,
when we were doing pelvics, I would say, 'Rena, you should have a pap
smear now,' and for various reasons she put it off.... [W]e already had
the equipment there and ready to do it and we always tried to tell girls to
have one every year." Medical records showed that Dr. Thomas was doing
ten to twenty pap smears each month for his patients, and his nurse said "it
was his normal custom and practice persistently to urge young child
bearing women to submit annually to a pap smear."'
106
Several times when Mrs. Truman asked for birth control pills, Dr.
Thomas said he would not prescribe them unless she had "a pelvic and a
pap smear." One of these times she said she couldn't afford it. He replied:
"'We just bought a boat from your husband'" (who had a local boat shop),
and he continued, "'Surely you can come in and have a complete
examination and have a pelvic and a pap smear and then we'll give you the
birth control pills and everything,' and she said she just couldn't afford it,
could she come in for the pelvic and get the birth control pills and come
back later for the pap smear, the complete examination.' ' 7 Dr. Thomas
agreed, but despite her promise, Mrs. Truman "didn't seem to get around"
to having the test. 08
Dr. Thomas said he was trying to persuade Mrs. Truman not just to
have a pap smear, but also to have a complete physical, including a blood
test and a breast examination. Once, when Dr. Thomas prescribed
medication for a urinary tract infection, he told Mrs. Truman to come back
for a complete examination. But when he saw her again for similar
difficulties, "she was having her menstrual period and was unable to allow
us to proceed with the pelvic exam or a complete exam and again asked to
[delay].' ' 9
In April 1969, Mrs. Truman saw an urologist, who found an extremely
rough cervix and a heavy vaginal discharge. The urologist told her how
grave this looked and advised her to see a gynecologist. Mrs. Truman
wanted to wait. The urologist saw her in June, July, and August, but she
still put off visiting a gynecologist. Finally, in October, the urologist
himself arranged for Mrs. Truman to see the gynecologist, who diagnosed
her disease.
In sum, from Dr. Thomas's point of view, Mrs. Truman knew what a
'06 Id at 753.





pap smear was (since she had had one); he repeatedly urged her to have a
pap smear; she repeatedly declined; he demonstrated the pap smear's
importance by offering to defer his fee, by pestering her to have one, and
by threatening to withhold other services if she didn't. As the appellate
court observed, Mrs. Truman "continually told defendant she would have a
pap smear done shortly in connection with a complete physical
examination," so that there "was never a direct express refusal by her to
follow the recommendation; there was only procrastination."' 10 And
procrastination seems to have been Mrs. Truman's unbreakable pattern,
even when faced with alarming evidence of deadly illness.
Given the standard view of informed consent,"' given the patient as
director of care, the court's decision to allow suit looks straightforward.
Patients make their own decisions; doctors should give them the data they
need to do so. Whether to have a pap smear is a medical decision.
Therefore, the patient needs all relevant information about its usefulness.
Quod erat demonstrandum. And aren't screening decisions exactly the
kind of choices patients need good-even statistical-information about,
since there are lively controversies among experts about the value of many
such tests?' 12
Truman shows just how dangerous a doctor's encounter with
malpractice law can be when a patient says no. Dr. Thomas apparently
exerted himself admirably to persuade his patient to good sense in the face
of her prolonged and frustrating refusal. But because he did not utter the
particular words the California Supreme Court imagined would have
changed Mrs. Truman's mind, Dr. Thomas's case was remanded for,
presumably, another trial (or a disadvantageous settlement).
The California Supreme Court seems to have accepted the position of
the dissenting judge on the Court of Appeal: "Can it be doubted that, had
the decedent in this case known that for $6 and mild discomfort she could
discover the existence of cervical cancer and thus survive, she would have
taken the test? Central to her failure to take the test was a clear lack of
understanding of the significance of the doctor's recommendation."
' 13
This is just laughable. First and least, Dr. Thomas had a point when he
argued that the purpose of pap smears is well known, and it is standard law
that doctors need not tell patients well-known things. Second, how could
Mrs. Truman have failed to realize the test's importance? Dr. Thomas
"10 Id at 760 n 3.
. Cobbs v Grant, 502 P2d 1, 10-11 (Cal 1972), is not only the relevant California precedent but
also one of the best known informed-consent cases.
112 For a survey of the literature making such exigent arguments about informed consent for
screening, particularly in the context of mammography, see Peter H. Schwartz and Eric M. Meslin, The
Ethics of Information: Absolute Risk Reduction and Patient Understanding of Screening, 23 J Gen Int
Med 867 (June 2008).
13 Truman, 155 Cal Rptr at 762.
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nagged her for several years about having one. Surely she perceived that
he thought the pap smear was necessary even if she did not know exactly
why. Third and most significantly, the court's view of how patients think
is desperately simple-minded. People frequently fail to follow medical
advice even when treatment is easy and they know its value. The standard
estimate, for example, is that patients take medications as prescribed only
about half the time.'
1 4
Especially, people routinely resist discovering serious medical
problems. For example, those who know cancer's danger signs are likelier
to postpone seeing a physician than those who do not.' 5  Even the
chronically ill may feel as Tim Brookes does: "[T]o seek medical treatment
is to admit the disease ... [and to] have our chronic fallibility, our
mortality, exposed."" 6 So one physician postponed investigating his own
cancer symptoms: "I wondered why I had been so foolish .... I had acted
like many of my patients had, accepting the [less worrisome] diagnosis to
avoid facing something else."'" 7 Reynolds Price is typical: "Inquisitive to
a fault though I'd been all my life, some deep-down voice was running me
now. Its primal aim was self-preservation. Don't make them tell you, and
it may not happen. Whatever they tell you may be wrong anyhow. Stay
quiet. Stay dark.""'
Ultimately, Mrs. Truman probably did not know herself why she said
no. Was money the issue? Was fear? Had Dr. Thomas exacerbated her
fear, would she have changed her opinion or confirmed it? People are not
the robots the law imagines. They are a riot of reason and unreason, and
good doctors work sympathetically and tactfully with the riot they
encounter.
In sum, neither of the two standard defenses fits the relational
dynamics of consumerist patients who refuse some of their doctors'
recommendations but receive other treatment. Doctors need something
better than to have their attempts to respond to patients' requests second-
guessed by courts with little grasp of the doctor's actual dilemmas, with an
impoverished sense of how real patients think, and with too dogmatic a
doctrine. Doctors need guidance about whether and when it is safe to
provide less-than-optimal, and perhaps "substandard," treatment in order to
save their patients' money. Doctors need all this not for themselves, but
for the sake of the public policy of consumerist health care.
14 Vermeire, et al, 26 J Clinical Pharmacy & Therapeutics at 331, 334 (cited in note 73).
115 See Raymond Rink, Delay Behavior in Breast Cancer Screening, in J.W. Cullen, B.H. Fox,
and R.N. Isom, eds, Cancer: The Behavioral Dimensions 23 (Raven 1976).
116 Tim Brookes, Catching M* Breath: An Asthmatic Explores His Illness 39 (Times Books 1994).
117 Edward E. Rosenbaum, The Doctor: When the Doctor is the Patient 52 (Ballantine 1988).
118 Reynolds Price, A Whole New Life I 1 (Atheneum 1994).
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IV. THE SOLUTION FROM LEGAL ETHICS
If lawyers are thoughtful about anything, it is the law that governs
themselves. Therefore, their position on whether professional obligations
can be limited to fit clients' budgets should be instructive. And it is.
Briefly, the law of lawyering distinguishes between the standard of care
and the quantity of resources devoted to a case. Lawyers' basic obligations
of skill and attentiveness do not depend on clients' resources, but the time
and money they devote to a case may be tailored to a client's budget. In
other words, lawyers cannot justify laziness, sloppiness, or foolishness
simply because clients are poor or parsimonious, but they can work fewer
hours, do less research, take fewer depositions, forego experts, use simpler
documents, and the like. Lawyers need not lower their professional
standards this way, but they may. In fact, they usually do. There is almost
always more work that could be done on a problem than is justifiable
economically from the client's viewpoint.
The law of lawyering is not quite this unambiguous. It says piously,
for instance, that lawyers should be "zealous" in their advocacy and
"diligent" in their representation." 9 Nor may the client waive the basic
duty of competence.' But these duties clearly are limited by the client's
willingness to pay. Three leading scholars say:
[L]awyers and clients normally should be able to agree that the
lawyer will commit more or less time and energy to the client's
cause, assume more or less responsibility, and generate more or
less in the way of legal fees. For example, by obtaining an
agreement from the client to limit the objectives to be sought, the
lawyer can tailor the representation to fit the lawyer's time or
inclination, as well as the client's pocketbook. 2 '
19 ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 Comment 1 (ABA 5th ed
2003).
120 Id Rule 1.2 Comment 7.
121 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes, and Peter R. Jarvis, The Law ofLawyering § 5.10
(Aspen 3d ed 2008 Supp). Two other respected scholars agree that:
[T]he means that a lawyer may or must use in the course of that representation can
also be contractually regulated-and frequently are. A lawyer and client can agree that the
lawyer will spend no more than a set amount of time or money defending a lawsuit,
studying a contract or will, or researching the title to a piece of property. More often
though, lawyers and clients decide matters like these as they arise. A lawyer will consult a
client before engaging an expert witness or beginning a research project that is likely to
require a good deal of time.
David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and
the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 959, 969 (1998). And yet another
sums things up:
[Tiort law does not insist that Volkswagens be as safe as Volvos, nor does it require that
a Legal Aid attorney handle a client's matrimonial problems in the same manner as would
Donald Trump's team of lawyers.... Indeed, in the legal malpractice context, the concept that
the amount of service owed a client is dependent upon the amount of service that the client has
agreed to pay for is virtually unquestioned.
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Similarly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit a client to
"exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the
client's objectives ...[if] the client thinks [they] are too costly." Such
limitations are a "factor to be considered when determining the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.' 122  This rule provides "a framework within which
lawyers may expand access to legal services by providing limited but
nonetheless valuable legal services to low or moderate-income persons
who otherwise would be unable to obtain counsel.' 23  The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers likewise recognizes that "for some
clients the costs of more extensive services may outweigh their
benefits.' 24  A corporation might wish to litigate a case within a budget
that requires "conducting limited discovery, which could materially lessen
the likelihood of success." A person might wish to pay only for a thirty-
minute review of a tax return, though this might not uncover all the
possible problems. 125  As long as the clients know the risk of these
limitations, they are allowable, the Restatement explains, because the
clients obtain something of benefit and because they may, if they wish,
purchase more assistance.
1 26
The only relevant area of real controversy is whether liability insurers
can limit retained lawyers to a set budget. Because an insurer-paid defense
is on behalf of the policyholder, this three-party situation is trickier-it is
closer to the problems presented by managed-care insurance than to the
problems of consumer-directed care. This is because the defense lawyer
has competing loyalties to the policyholder and the insurer. The weight of
opinion appears to permit insurers to limit defense expenses if the lawyer
reasonably believes that competent representation is still possible and if the
policyholders are adequately informed (so they can pay for additional
effort or other lawyers if they wish). 27  In other words, the law of
Siliciano, 77 Va L Rev at 481 & n 138 (cited in note 55).
'22 ABA, Model Rules Rule 1.2 Comments 6 & 7 (cited in note 120).
123 Id Rule 1.2 Annotation subsection (c). See also Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-
Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L Rev 295 (1997)
(arguing for unbundling legal services to allow low-income clients to hire attorneys only to provide
discrete functions).
124 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 19 Comment (b) (ALl 2000).
125 Id §19, Illustrations I & 2. See also ABA, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal and Informal Opinions 1983-1998 Informal Opinion 85-1515 (ABA 2000)
(permitting lawyers to provide simple wills from booth at the state fair); Task Force on Lawyer
Business Ethics, Statements of Principles, 51 ABA Bus L 1303, 1312 (1996) (noting that a client can
decide that "a 'leave-no-stone-unturned' approach is appropriate, or [that] the client prefer[s] to accept
some risk in order to avoid some of the costs attendant to such an approach").
126 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 19 Illustratiors I and 2 (ALl 2000).
See also Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay
For?, I I Georgetown J Legal Ethics 915, 921(1998) ("[T]he agreement must be voluntary, relatively
informed, and within the bounds of reason.").
127 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 134 Illustration 5 (ALI 2000).
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lawyering hesitates only at the point of allowing policyholders to authorize
third party insurers to set cost constraints on their joint behalves. Because
this in fact is permitted, a fortiori clients may set their own constraints
directly. Two estimable scholars analogize this rule directly to limited
medical services:
[P]eople are free to buy less than a "gold-plated" attorney....
[W]hen buying liability insurance, [insureds] may prefer to pay for
less expensive lawyering, just as consumers of health insurance
increasingly choose cost savings over unlimited expensive medical
care. We believe that just as doctors should not have exclusive
authority to define how much medical care consumers must buy,
lawyers should not be able to employ professional responsibility
law to control the amount of legal services insureds must buy.
128
V. A SOLUTION: RESOURCE-VARIABLE STANDARDS
Law should allow consumer-driven physicians to honor patients' cost-
motivated preferences, but doctors should not automatically do so.
Instead, they should decide individually how low to go and how
strenuously to urge patients to accept the recommended care.
129
Professional ethics bar physicians from providing care that is less than
"competent,"'130 and they enjoin physicians to refuse to "violate
fundamental personal values, standards of scientific or ethical practice, or
the law.' 131  Legally, physicians may terminate care for any reason,
including money, but only at a non-critical point in the treatment when
patients can find alternative care. 132 These principles usually leave doctors
free to fire patients who insist on care the doctor thinks intolerably
substandard.
133
128 Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense
Lawyers, 45 Duke L J 255, 362-63 (1995).
129 For instance, one study found that Dutch oncologists are more willing to pressure or persuade
patients if they refuse treatment with a curative rather than palliative goal. Titia van Kleffens, Berna
van Baarsen, and Evert van Leeuwen, The Medical Practice of Patient Autonomy and Cancer
Treatment Refusals: A Patients' and Physicians' Perspective, 58 Soc Sci & Med 2325 (2004). We
found similar attitudes in our more limited pilot interviews with primary physicians. They were more
willing, for example, to help patients choose cheaper but less effective medication for arthritis than for
heart conditions.
30 AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics § 1 (2001), online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/2001_principles.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2008).
131 Joseph A. Carrese, Refusal of Care: Patients' Well-Being and Physicians'Ethical Obligations,
296 JAMA 691, 694 (2006).
132 Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 Ariz St L J 1091, 1111-12 n 49 (1998); Mark A.
Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 Ga L Rev 511, 528-33 (1997); Edward B. Hirshfeld,
Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed to Accommodate New Models for
Rationing Health Care?, 140 Pa L Rev at 1839-41; Mathew Robert Gregory, Hard Choices: Patient
Autonomy in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 30 Jurimetrics J 483, 499 (1990).
133 See, for example, Matthies v Mastromonaco, 709 A2d 238, 253 (NJ Super App Div 1998),
affd 733 A2d 456 (NJ 1999) ("If the patient selects a course, even from among reasonable alternatives,
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But for consumerism to succeed, the law must protect providers who
continue to treat patients who decline to pay for optimal treatment. Legal
scholars have already shown how that might be accomplished under
existing principles: by separating the resource component from the skill
component of the standard of care. 134  These scholars suggest that the
medical malpractice standard that developed under comprehensive
insurance conflates two distinct components: (1) the resources physicians
devote to helping a patient, such as treatments, facilities, diagnostic
technologies, and medications, and (2) the skill and care doctors employ in
using these resources.'
35
Historically, resources were limited by the primitive state of medicine.
Therefore, earlier statements about the consistency of medical standards
across patients of different financial means applied mainly to the skill and
care component. 36  And still today, physicians think of themselves as
following an unvarying standard of carefulness. Consider, for instance,
how the former head of Medicare explained this point to physicians.
Posing to doctors a scenario of discovering just before performing surgery
that they would be paid sixty percent less than they had thought, he asks
"Will you do it any less well?" and then quickly notes that most doctors
"will appropriately take umbrage at the very question ... and insist that
their actual performance in surgery would be no different at the lower fee
than the higher." Nor do doctors volunteering "to provide free services at a
local clinic or in a third world refugee camp [perform] at a lower
professional level, or [provide] a lower quality service-although the
practice environment may be of lower, or at least different, quality." In
short, to say "that a professional paid 2x will perform significantly better
than if he is paid x is to describe behavior that is inherently
which the physician regards as inappropriate or disagreeable, the physician is free to refuse to
participate and to withdraw from the case upon providing reasonable assurances that basic treatment
and care will continue. In such circumstances, there can be no liability for the refusal."). But see
Menikoff, 30 Ariz St L J 1091 (cited in note 134) (arguing that doctors are free to refuse care that is
more costly than a minimally acceptable standard).
134 The first article to draw this distinction was Randall R. Bovbjerg and William G. Kopit,
Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 Ind L Rev 857, 916
(1986) ('Partly through an unfortunate linguistic coincidence, the legal standard of "care," which
originally meant the degree of carefulness required to be non-negligent, has come to mean also what
services themselves are appropriate. Some rethinking seems called for here."). Others who further
developed this idea include E. Haavi Morreim, Holding Health Care Accountable at 80-82 (cited in
note 41); Frankel, Note, 103 Yale L J 1297 (cited in note 35); Siliciano, 77 Va L Rev 439 (cited in note
55); E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 L, Med & Health Care
356 (1989).
13' This distinction is similar to that in products liability between conscious design choices and
manufacturing defects. James A. Henderson, Jr. and John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 Comell L Rev 1382, 1385 n
16, 1396 n 48 (1994).
136 See, for example, Becker v Janinski, 15 NYS 675 (NYCP 1891), quoted in note 37, which
concerned a physician who failed to attend properly to a woman who had miscarried.
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unprofessional."' 137
As medicine advanced, however, the resource aspect of the standard of
care became relevant. The law could have set resource standards using
either contract or tort doctrine. Because tort law almost necessarily applies
to the care and skill component, the simpler solution historically was to
apply tort law to both components. Moreover, contract principles were
largely inapposite to the resource component when neither doctor nor
patient controlled most resource constraints. These constraints were
imposed mainly by geography or facilities or by managed-care insurance.
When insurance requires that patients set their own limits, contract
principles play a greater role in establishing doctors' legal obligations.
Therefore, today, the skill component still raises tort issues, but resource
commitments are best interpreted through contract.
138
A contractual approach is fully consistent with the legal understanding
that contract defines a doctor's basic obligations at the outset of the
relationship. For instance, doctors can specify that they are responsible
only for some aspects of a case and not others, or that they will provide
only office-based but not hospital care. 139  Similarly, contract principles
should allow doctors to agree to limit the resources they use. Within those
boundaries, tort law asks how well the resources are employed, but it does
not ask whether it was good or bad medicine to agree to patients' wishes to
limit options.
One doctrinal glitch with this contractual approach is that,
traditionally, doctors' legal obligations begin when they take a case.
Simply agreeing to see a patient or beginning a diagnosis can initiate a
relationship. 140 This hair-trigger formation of the medical relationship
contrasts with the rules for legal services. 14  Lawyers and their potential
clients generally have time to confer before deciding whether and how the
lawyer should represent the client. Because medical care can be urgent,
doctors and patients do not always have this luxury. In addition, once
people become patients, they often have a series of problems which cannot
be anticipated. Lawyers are more likely to be hired for single episodes.
Also, doctors may not freely drop a case after it is evaluated.1 42 Instead,
137 He attributes this to Uwe Reinhardt. Bruce C. Vladeck, If Paying for Quality Is Such a Bad
Idea, Why Is Everyone for It?, 60 Wash & Lee L Rev 1345, 1369-70 (2003).
138 See Morreim, Holding Health Care Accountable at 91 (cited in note 41); Siliciano, 77 Va L
Rev at 440 & n 6 (cited in note 55).
39 Annotation, Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 ALR2d 432 (1958).
140 See generally Richard J. Kohlman, Existence of Physician and Patient Relationship, 46 Am
Jur 2d Proof Facts 373, 379 (1986); Steven E. Pegalis, I American Law of Medical Malpractice § 2.3
(1980).
141 See Silver and Syverud, 45 Duke L J at 290 (cited in note 129) (emphasizing extent to which
scope of responsibility for legal services is defined in first instance by retainer agreement, rather than
this agreement limiting pre-existing obligation).
142 See, for example, Harris v Griffin, 612 SE2d 7 (Ga Ct App 2005).
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they must treat patients who cannot readily find other care. Therefore, the
solution for lawyers-that limitations on the representation are usually
specified in advance-will not work reliably for doctors. They, and their
patients need to determine what measures are affordable as diagnosis and
treatment unfold. 1
43
Expecting doctors to do what they can with limited resources
reconciles seemingly inconsistent doctrines. Contract law cannot be used
to waive the basic tort standard of care because it includes the mandatory-
skill component. Contractually limiting the resources available for
treatment does not absolve a doctor from the duty of care in employing
those resources. Speaking of a unitary standard of care obscures this
important distinction; untangling these two components of medical
standards helps to clarify which part is contractable and which is not.
Distinguishing competence failures and resource failures can surely be
taxing. Nevertheless, the distinction is quite comprehensible, and it is
generally consistent with the law we have reviewed.44 The only decision
that might appear contrary actually recognizes this distinction. Moss v.
Miller held that the basic standard of care should not be lower for
prisoners.145 But the court's conclusion that resource "constraints, while
interfering with proper medical care, do not lessen the standards required
of the medical arts practitioner"' 46 makes sense only if one distinguishes
the skill-and-care from the resource component of the legal standard. The
same is true of the federal statute which says that following Medicare's
cost-containment guidelines protects doctors from negligence liability if
they "exercised due care in all professional conduct."' 47 This statute is
incoherent if the standard of care is all-encompassing, but it can make
sense because the statute's cost-sensitive guidelines can be applied either
skillfully or carelessly.
Legal scholars generally agree that medical resources should be
separated from the general standard of care, but they differ on how to
disentangle the complex components of clinical behavior. Some analysts
think the law should simply distinguish what is done from how it is done
and apply the general standard of care only to the latter. 48 However,
doctors can make negligent mistakes in both arenas whatever their
resources. For instance, doctors might forego essential diagnostic or
143 Consistent with our recommendation, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act allows hospital emergency rooms to decide whether or not to transfer a patient after they conduct a
mandatory initial screening evaluation. 42 USC § 1395dd.
144 Text at notes 42-46.
14' 625 NE2d 1044, 1051 (111 App Ct 1993).
146 Id.
14' 42 USC § 1320c-6.
14' Frankel, Note, 103 Yale L J at 1323 (cited in note 35); Bovbjerg and Kopit, 19 Ind L Rev at
916 (cited in note 135).
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treatment measures simply because they did not realize their necessity.
Morreim, the leading advocate of the resource distinction, goes a step
further. She argues that when a test is omitted, liability should turn on the
doctor's reasons: "If the physician simply did not know the test was
needed, the basic problem would still concern [negligent] expertise." But
"if the physician knew the testing was indicated but did not order it
because the patient's insurer refused to pay, the situation poses a resource
issue." So "[o]nly a careful factual investigation can determine, in any
given case, whether an expertise or a resource deficiency, or both, or
neither, caused the patient's adverse outcome.' 49
This raises the concerns we canvassed earlier regarding affirmative
defenses. 50 Detailed evaluations of doctors' reasoning are just what to
avoid. First, no factfinder-judge, jury, expert panel---can reliably figure
out years later exactly what mix of motives animated a physician's
decision; the relationship between patient, doctor, and decision will too
often be too complex and wholly misremembered. This is one of
Truman's lessons. Second, as we have argued, malpractice law needs to
make it palpably safe for physicians to promote the consumerism that is
now public policy. Having different liability rules for each component of a
medical decision is complicated enough. Varying those rules for each type
of insurance (conventional versus managed-care versus high-deductible)
and each mix of motives would mystify judges and juries and justify
doctors in their (otherwise often unjustifiable) contempt for the law and its
surreality.
A simpler approach would diminish these difficulties. It would judge a
patient's treatment under a professional negligence standard that accounts
for patient-imposed resource limitations. Such limitations would not
reduce the minimal skill and attentiveness required, but they would let
doctors provide thriftier treatment to some patients than others-as long as
the overall care is within professional norms. One way to accomplish this
is through more active use of the "respectable minority" or "schools of
thought" doctrine. 15  This doctrine is usually only an affirmative defense
for physicians who subscribe to alternative medical philosophies. It could
be adapted to allow doctors to accommodate patients' varying financial
situations. This should be permitted as long as each patient receives
treatment that is acceptable under some legitimate school of thought.
Conceived this way, it becomes the plaintiffs burden to show not just that
the doctor departed from the dominant school of thought, but instead that
149 Morreim, Holding Health Care Accountable at 82 (cited in note 41).
15o Text at notes 71-92.
15 See, for example, Mark A. Hall, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 129 (cited in note 54); Mark A.
Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 L, Med & Health Care 347
(1989).
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the treatment is supported by no respectable professional point of view.
This recasting of the plaintiffs burden would better protect doctors who
adopt different practice styles to accommodate their patients' financial
choices.
The schools-of-thought and the resource-context approaches to the
standard of care make sense for discretionary decisions not to recommend
care, but not for patients who adamantly refuse treatment all doctors would
advise. When that happens, we return to the core dilemma in its strongest
form: May a doctor provide substandard treatment to a patient who
selectively refuses more expensive care, where the doctor's only
alternatives are to fire the patient or insist that the patient accept unwanted
treatment? This problem is not well handled by subjecting to negligence
law all treatment refusals directed by patients. Instead, such patient-
directed decisiofis should be regarded as contractually determined.
A remaining problem with the contractual approach is that fiduciary
principles strongly influence how contract principles apply to medical
decisions. 112 Informed-consent law is the leading example. But, as we saw
earlier, if full-bore informed consent applied to treatment refusals, doctors
could rarely honor them without strenuously trying to talk patients out of
their decisions. Doctors may behave this way, and sometimes should, but
adversarial medicine and heavy-handed sales techniques should hardly be
legally required.
Stringent informed-consent standards should not be applied to cost-
motivated treatment refusals for still another reason. Normally, informed
consent applies to treatment for which the doctor may charge a fee but
which poses risks for the patient. When recommended treatment is
refused, the stakes are turned. Patients assert themselves to guard against
medical risk and cost, contrary to the doctor's.professional inclinations and
economic interests. Because doctors have incentives to convince patients
to say yes, the law need not scrutinize how vigorously they did so.
For all these reasons, the law should take at face value any evidence
that patients refused treatment. Law should not require special evidence or
proof of informed refusal, assumption of risk, or waiver of liability. The
doctor must allege and prove that the patient refused treatment, but if the
preponderance of the evidence shows actual patient refusal, that should end
liability issues arising from the omitted treatments. 5 3 When patients have
not refused a treatment, doctors should still be able to defend themselves
152 See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining
Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U Pitt L Rev 365 (1990).
153 Absent extraordinary circumstances, these might include species of fraud or negligence in
misrepresenting the nature and purpose of proposed treatments. Also, uninsured patients require
special consideration because they may have no realistic ability to pay and so their treatment refusals




(under an accommodating version of the "schools of thought" rule) by
showing that they did a decent job considering the resources at hand. This
may require expert testimony but avoids requiring that doctors document a
specific patient refusal for each omitted item.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Why This Puzzle Matters
Our principal task in this Article is to show how the tectonic plates
supporting the laws of malpractice, bioethics, and health care finance are
colliding in ways that will require adjustments in legal doctrine. We have
seen that when patients want to say no to save money, doctors must be able
to acquiesce, but incentives created by the law of malpractice counsel
otherwise. We have used our malpractice puzzle as one example of the
kinds of conflicts that are arising in the new tectonic world and of how
answers might be worked out. But this puzzle is also worth solving for
itself.
Physicians and their professional organizations have long and lavishly
overestimated liability threats,154 especially in response to market changes
that threaten their professional environment. For instance, doctors
dreadfully exaggerated the legal risks of telemedicine and of managed-care
gatekeeping.' 55  Under high-deductible health insurance and other
consumerist arrangements, doctors have principled reason to fear suits.
This perception could create the reality of actual resistance to patient-
imposed cost pressures, and these reactions themselves will drive
professional and legal norms. Therefore, the law should state clearly and
early the legal consequences of patients' cost-motivated refusals.
The need for the law to do so is considerably sharpened by the fact that
our old method of cost control-managed care-is being supplemented by
consumerist attempts to control medical costs. That presents our Rubik's
cube puzzle-should doctors be liable if they accept a patient's refusal of
recommended treatment? We know the answer must be no. That is the
answer the law of bioethics demands. That is the answer the law of health
care finance currently demands. But that is the answer the law of
malpractice makes difficult. The standard defenses of waiver and
assumption of risk do not suffice because they are affirmative defenses that
expose doctors to too much litigation burden and risk. Under the public
policy of consumer-driven cost control, doctors must be able to accept a
patient's "no." Therefore, we recommends the simple legal rule that no
154 Michelle M. Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 Tex L Rev 1595, 1609 (2002).
' Mark A. Hall, Ralph A. Peeples, and Richard W. Lord, Jr., Liability Implications of Physician-
Directed Care Coordination, 3 Annals Fain Med 115, 119 (2005).
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means no.
Our position should mitigate physicians' legitimate concerns by
freeing them from the travails of an affirmative defense. Yet our position
protects patients' interests, in three principal ways. First, doctors cannot
insist on waiving the basic, minimum standard of skill, care, and
attentiveness, no matter how little patients will pay. Second, if patients do
not specifically refuse recommended treatments, doctors are liable if they
do not treat patients reasonably, following at least some respectable school
of thought. Finally, freeing doctors to adapt treatment to patients' cost
preferences will lessen any legal reason doctors might assert for refusing
patients who cannot or will not pay top dollar.
We may be seen as letting doctors off the hook too easily. Sustaining
the quality of medical care is surely difficult. And neither the law nor the
profession deals adequately with incompetent doctors. But that is no
reason to make malpractice law unreasonable or unresponsive to all other
public policies. True, this attitude must occasionally lead to unrequited
injury, but that cost is outweighed by the costs of the alternatives.
B. Other Puzzles
We have just begun a conversation about a subject-tectonic clashes-
rich in such puzzles. For instance, even our little malpractice exercise can
be extended impressively. Our puzzle asks what to do if a patient says no.
But should a doctor always have to ask for a yes or a no? Can a doctor
anticipate a no?
In the easiest case, a doctor knows a patient well enough to know that
the patient will decline some kinds of desirable treatments for cost reasons.
Need the doctor go through the form of explaining the choice and soliciting
the no? On one view, the law of bioethics relieves the doctor of that duty.
If patients really are the directors of care, they should be able to choose the
kind of interactions with doctors they want. They should be able to choose
a doctor who anticipates their preferences without hectoring them with
unnecessary and unwanted choices and explanations. And of course the
law of health care finance thrusts in the same direction, since it wants to
proliferate thrifty consumers.
Now take the next step. The doctor does not know the patient well
enough to anticipate a no. But the doctor does not mention a possibly
desirable treatment for cost reasons. This may seem prima facie
unacceptable. Mustn't patients always be offered such a choice? In fact,
in ordinary medical practice, patients are continually kept in the dark about
all the possibilities. Differential diagnoses normally include nasty but
unlikely possibilities. But doctors do not mention them and do not suggest
20091
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testing for them partly for cost reasons.1 6 They heed the old adage: when
you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras. Sometimes it really is a
zebra, but good doctors don't rule out every possible zebra.
Screening tests are a good example of this problem. There is evidence
that some screens are cost-effective. There is evidence that some screens
are not. The evidence about other screens is controvertible. Ordinarily, a
doctor is presumably obliged to offer the first kind of screen. Is the doctor
also obliged to offer the third kind? That is what some of the groups that
write guidelines for practicing physicians say. For example, when
advisory committees of specialists could not decide whether Prostate
Specific Antigen ("PSA") screening was worthwhile, they said doctors
should present the choice to patients.
This certainly fits one understanding of the law of bioethics. This is
the understanding we might pejoratively describe as the "menu" version of
the doctor's role. Here are all your choices. Here is information about all
the choices. Would you like the PSA screen today? But on the view of
bioethics we hinted at a moment ago, a doctor might conclude this is not
the relationship with physicians that patients actually want. They may
want doctors who sort through the mass of choices it might be fruitful for
them to make and select the choices worth presenting. This could mean
excluding choices doctors thought financially improvident or foolish.
This description of the doctor's role conforms to one understanding of
what the law of health care finance might call for. Thrifty consumers
know that an expensive car has useful safety features cheaper cars do not.
But they also see little point in learning about the marvels of Volvos they
cannot afford. Thrifty patients may not see a point in hearing about a lot of
tests and treatments that might conceivably do them some good but that
their doctor thinks are not worth the cost to them.
Furthermore, doctors cannot offer their patients all the choices that
might benefit them. They simply don't have time. For example, it is
physically impossible for doctors to offer patients all the preventive
medicine that authoritative guidelines call for. 51  Therefore, doctors
156 Simon N. Whitney and Laurence B. McCullough, Physicians' Silent Decisions: Because
Patient Autonomy Does Not Always Come First, 7 Am J Bioethics 33 (2007).
157 For a critical study of what happens when doctors actually try to present the PSA choice to
patients, see Carl E. Schneider and Michael H. Farrell, Information, Decisions, and the Limits of
Informed Consent, in Michael Freeman and Andrew D.E. Lewis, eds, Law and Medicine 108 (Oxford
2000). For an illustration of what happens when they do not present the choice, see Daniel Merenstein,
Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004).
158 One study "demonstrates that it is not feasible for physicians to deliver all of the services
recommended by the USPSTF [US Preventive Services Task Force] to a representative panel of
patients." And "[d]ecreasing the panel size is not a very practical or realistic solution; a 50% reduction
in panel size is needed to reduce the time requirement to approximately 4 hours a day." Kimberly S.H.
Yamall et al, Primary Care: Is There Enough Time for Prevention?, 93 Am J Pub Health 635, 637
(2003). To put the problem another way: "Current practice guidelines for only 10 chronic illnesses
require more time than primary care physicians have available for patient care overall." Truls Ostbye
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routinely face zero-sum choices about how to spend their time with
patients, and they routinely deny patients choices it would be good for
them to have because the time to do so is flatly not there. Seen in this way,
the law of informed consent, like the law of health care finance, presents
rationing issues. They each rest on a separate tectonic plate. When these
plates clash, we must find some accommodation that allows each its due.
C. The Plates
When malpractice law developed, doctors were the directors of their
patients' care. Doctors are members of a profession which, like all
professions, requires mastering an abstruse body of learning. This creates
an "asymmetry of knowledge" between the professional and the client.
Because the client lacks the expertise to evaluate the professional, the
professional works autonomously, using professional expertise to assess
and assist the client. The client must trust the professional. The profession
must make it safe to trust the professional by educating, licensing, and
disciplining its members. When this fails, when the professional betrays
the profession's standards, the law provides a remedy in a malpractice
action. Still, the standard by which the professional is judged is the
standard set by the profession itself (as represented by expert testimony).
As long as the tectonic plates remained separate, this standard view of
malpractice made sense. And there remains much truth in this picture of
professions and the law of malpractice. However, in the laws of bioethics
and health care finance, much has changed. The doctor is no longer the
director of care; the patient is. Doctors are supposed to minimize the
"asymmetry of knowledge" by telling patients what they need to know to
make their own decisions. It is not just the relationship between doctor and
patient that is supposed to have changed. It is the relationship between the
profession and society. Medical care is organized bureaucratically, and the
behavior of physicians is shaped by systematized standards and by
administrative regulation. Some of this is intended to improve the quality
of medical care, but much of it is addressed to the continuing crisis of
costs. For many years, both goals were to be served by managed care.
Malpractice law set a unitary standard for practice (the professional
standard) to be enforced by the profession and by tort law. When doctors
were the directors of care, it made sense to hold them to the professional
standard. Now doctors have not just ceded some authority to patients; their
authority has also been diminished by regulators, insurers, and employers.
All this makes conventional malpractice law increasingly out of touch with
the way that doctors do their work and work with their patients.
et al, Is There Time for Management of Patients with Chronic Diseases in Primary Care?, 3 Annals
Fam Med 209 (2005).
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Managed care first exposed this problem to easy view. It deliberately
diffused responsibility for medical decisions among employers, insurers,
health care institutions, providers and patients. In particular, it sought to
influence and control doctors but not to take responsibility away from
them. Malpractice law was still trying to cope with this diffusion of
authority when another idea arose-that medical spending will be better
controlled and rationalized if patients, at least in principle, are the directors
of care. In sum, the relations between doctors and patients have become
the subject of constant policy making, especially because doctors are key
to any effort to control apparently uncontrollable medical costs. But law
and policy cannot do so well unless here-as in so many other places-we
recognize that the interaction of health law's component parts is an
indispensable part of intelligent policy analysis.
